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(TRANS)FORMING THE PROVOCATION
DEFENSE
Morgan Tilleman ∗
“My family, some who are with me here tonight, always loved and supported Angie.
We understood that she was born in a boy’s body but she was a woman. So many
transgender people do not receive that love, acceptance and support.”
—Monica Zapata 1

I. GREELEY, COLORADO: JULY 17, 2009
Sometime in 2008, Angie Zapata, then eighteen, met a thirty-two-yearold man on a social networking site called Moco Space, 2 and they began to
chat. 3 Later that year, in mid-July, she met that man, Allen Ray Andrade,
in person for a date. 4 A few days later, Angie’s sister, Monica Zapata,
found Angie’s body in Angie’s apartment, stiff and “covered with a
bloodstained blanket.” 5 She had been beaten to death with fists and a fire
extinguisher. 6
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1
Angie Zapata’s Story Honored by Family and GLAAD, GLAADBLOG (April 29, 2009),
http://glaadblog.org/2009/04/29/angie-zapatas-story-honored-by-family-and-glaad-2/. This
Comment is for Angie Zapata and for her family, whose strength, love, and character have
inspired and awed me throughout the project of writing it.
2
Sharon Dunn, Andrade: Stunned Victim or Homophobic Killer?, GREELEY TRIB. (Apr.
17, 2009), http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20090417/NEWS/904169867.
3
DeeDee Correll, Colo. Transgender Woman’s Slaying is Tried as Hate Crime, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at A3.
4
Id.
5
Melanie Asmar, Who Was Angie Zapata? Her Murderer’s Trial Didn’t Tell the Whole
Story, DENVER WESTWORD (May 28, 2009), http://www.westword.com/2009-0528/news/who-was-angie-zapata-her-murderer-s-trial-didn-t-tell-the-whole-story/.
6
Dan Frosch, Murder and Hate Verdict in Transgender Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2009, at A20.
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Angie Zapata was not an ordinary homicide victim, however. She was
“a teenage girl in every sense but the biological one,” according to her
sister. 7 When Angie was at her sister’s store, men “would make excuses to
hover [around her],” drawn by her “stunning” appearance. 8 Angie, who
was born Justin David Zapata, began presenting her gender as female fulltime in high school. 9 Her family and friends supported her as she grew
towards adulthood as a woman. 10 Angie Zapata was transgender, and the
trial of Allen Andrade, her killer, revolved around whether that fact
partially justified her murder. 11
II. THEORIES OF THE ZAPATA CASE
Less than a week after Angie Zapata’s death, police in Colorado
arrested Allen Andrade when he was found using Monica Zapata’s car and
credit card.12 During questioning after his arrest, Andrade told police “he
had attacked [Angie] upon discovering that she was biologically a man”
following sexual activity with her. 13 Melanie Asmar filled in the gaps
between Angie and Allen Andrade’s first meeting and Angie’s brutal
murder.
After their initial meeting in person, Angie spent three days with
Andrade before leaving to watch her sister’s children on July 16, 2008. 14
According to his statements to the police, Andrade spent that day by
himself in Angie’s apartment, where he increasingly suspected that she was
not, in fact, “female.”15 He claimed in the affidavit that he forced the issue
with Angie that night, and that she responded, “I am all woman.” 16 He
claimed he asked for proof, which she refused; he then reached for her
crotch, where he felt Angie’s penis. 17 According to the affidavit, Andrade
responded by punching Angie until she fell to the floor, at which point he
hit her over the head with a fire extinguisher twice. 18 After she fell to the
7

Correll, supra note 3, at A3.
Id.
9
Asmar, supra note 5.
10
Id.
11
For an overview of the theories advanced by both the prosecution and defense see
infra text accompanying notes 21–30.
12
Sharon Dunn, Key Question: When Did Andrade Know?, GREELEY TRIB., Apr. 16,
2009, at A1.
13
Frosch, supra note 6, at A20.
14
Asmar, supra note 5.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
8
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floor, Andrade covered her body with a blanket. 19 Then, because he “heard
gurgling sounds” coming from Zapata, he returned and struck her face with
the fire extinguisher one more time. 20
The brutal details of the crime were clear, but prosecutors and defense
attorneys suggested very different motives for the killing of Angie Zapata.
Prosecutors painted a picture of a brutal killer motivated by hatred and
prejudice who plotted the death of a transgender woman. 21 Given that
Andrade had confessed to police, his defense team chose to argue that he
had acted “in the heat of passion” upon unexpectedly discovering that
Angie had male genitalia. 22 In the words of Bradley Martin, one of
Andrade’s lawyers, “You will hear him say, ‘It happened so fast and so
hard, I couldn’t stop [the beating].’”23 Andrade’s lawyers based their
defense on Andrade’s sudden, unexpected awareness of Angie Zapata’s
anatomical sex. One of his attorneys, Annette Kundelius, told potential
jurors at jury selection, “When [Andrade] learned Angie was in fact Justin,
he immediately reacted. He had been deceived, and he reacted. He reacted,
he lost control, he was outside of himself.” 24 Andrade’s defense relied on
two critical points: first, that Angie “deceived” him about her “real” sex or
gender; and second, that this “deception” reasonably caused Allen Andrade
to lose control.
Prosecutors argued that Andrade did not learn that Angie was
transgender in the manner he claimed; Weld County Deputy District
Attorney Brandi Nieto told potential jurors, “You’re going to learn the
defendant knew for quite some time that Angie was biologically male.” 25
Instead, prosecutors argued, Andrade learned that Zapata was transgender
more than a day earlier when he went to traffic court with her. There, the
clerk referred to Zapata as Justin, not Angie. 26 Pointing out that the name
ought to have made Zapata’s transgender status obvious, Nieto concluded,
“[Killing Zapata] was not a snap decision.” 27 Prosecutors painted Andrade
as animated by his prejudice, transphobia, and homophobia. At trial, they

19

Id.
Id.
21
Monte Whaley, Transgender Victim, Man Had Hours of Texts, Talk, DENVER POST,
Apr. 17, 2009, at B-02.
22
Jim Spellman, Transgender Murder, Hate Crime Conviction a First, CNN.COM (Apr.
22, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/22/transgender.slaying.trial/index.html.
23
Whaley, supra note 21, at B-02.
24
Dunn, supra note 12, at A1.
25
Id.
26
Correll, supra note 3, at A3.
27
Id.
20
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entered transcripts of jail phone calls between Andrade and an unidentified
woman, where he told her, “It is not like I went up to a schoolteacher and
shot her in the head or killed a straight law-abiding citizen.” 28 In another
phone conversation admitted into evidence, Andrade said, “Gay things need
to die.” 29 Capturing the theory of bigotry put forth by the prosecution,
Nieto summarized the case: “[Andrade] makes it clear there is a difference
between killing someone who’s homosexual and someone who’s not. He
knew for some time [that Angie] was transgender, and he brutally killed her
because of it.” 30
After hearing both theories, twelve Colorado jurors took only two
hours to convict Allen Andrade of first-degree murder. 31 This is the first
known case in which an “anti-transgender murder was prosecuted as a hate
crime,” according to Crystal Middlestadt of the Colorado Anti-Violence
Program. 32 The hate crime enhancement to Andrade’s conviction added
three years to his sentence, a first anywhere in the United States.33 Zealous
prosecutors, strong evidence (including a confession), and a sympathetic
victim 34 combined in the aftermath of Angie Zapata’s death to see justice
done. The Andrade trial might suggest that the law, as written, will protect
transgender people—especially now that the Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2009 is federal law. 35 In many cases, however, the
evidence will not be as strong.

28

Frosch, supra note 6, at A20.
Id.
30
Dunn, supra note 2.
31
Sharon Dunn, Andrade Guilty, Sentenced to Life in Murder of Angie Zapata, GREELEY
TRIB. (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20090423/NEWS/904229934.
32
Karen Auge, A Milestone in Battling Hate Crimes, DENVER POST, Apr. 23, 2009,
at A-06.
33
Monte Whaley, Lifetime in Prison in Transgender Death, DENVER POST, Apr. 23,
2009, at A–01.
34
Angie Zapata’s family was a constant presence in the courtroom and media, mourning
the loss of a daughter or sister—and all of them were supportive of her life as a transgender
woman. For Maria Zapata’s reaction to the verdict, see Dunn, supra note 31 (quoting from
Zapata’s address to the judge after the verdict). For the reaction from Angie Zapata’s
mother, family, and friends, see Asmar, supra note 5 (recounting interviews with family and
friends of Angie Zapata in the aftermath of the trial).
35
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 11184, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009) (the “Matthew Shepard Act”) (providing for federal assistance in
cases involving bias-motivated acts). Under the new law, the federal government has
significantly enhanced powers to intervene in hate crimes prosecution.
29

The hate crimes legislation would give the federal government authority to prosecute violent
crimes of antigay bias when local authorities failed to act. It would also allocate $5 million a
year to the Justice Department to provide assistance to local communities in investigating hate
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Angie’s murder and Allen Andrade’s trial are an exception; many
transgender people die alone and their killers are never found. In 2008, the
Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation documented twenty-one
killings of transgender people.36 Angie’s murder is notable only for the fact
that it was solved. Other victims have not been so lucky. In February
2008, Simmie Williams, Jr. was shot to death in Fort Lauderdale, Florida;
Jaylynn L. Namauu was stabbed to death in Hawaii in July; Nikhia “Nikki”
Williams was shot and left to die in a dumpster behind her house in
Louisville, Kentucky, just over a month later.37 These names join a long
and growing list of almost 300 transgender people whose killings have been
documented by Transgender Day of Remembrance since 1970.38 The
experiences of transgender people across America suggest that more needs
to be done to protect them.
III. DEFINING TRANSGENDER
Some simplification, however fraught with political and definitional
difficulty, is necessary for the purposes of this Comment. To begin with, it
is important to recognize the difference between sex and gender. Relatively
standard definitions of both make the distinction clear: “Sex refers to the
classification of being either male or female and is usually determined by
the external genitalia.
Gender refers to the culturally determined
behavioral, social, and psychological traits that are typically associated
with being male or female.” 39 While not capturing the infinite complexity

crimes, a process that can sometimes strain police resources. And it would allow the department
to assist in the inquiry and local prosecution if requested.

Carl Hulse, House, 281–146, Votes to Define Antigay Attacks as Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES,
October 9, 2009, at A1 (commenting on the version of the bill passed by the House of
Representatives, which substantively reflects the language eventually signed into law). It
remains to be seen whether or not the Justice Department will use its newfound power to
intervene in hate crimes prosecution.
36
The Angie Zapata Murder: Violence Against Transgender People Resource Kit, GAY
AND LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, http://www.glaad.org/page.aspx?pid=572
(last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
37
Statistics and Other Info, TRANSGENDER DAY OF REMEMBRANCE (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.transgenderdor.org/?page_id=192.
38
Id.
39
MILDRED L. BROWN & CHLOE ANNE ROUNSLEY, TRUE SELVES 19 (1996). Academics
and clinicians in the field have also developed much more nuanced definitions of both sex
and gender. Julie A. Greenberg begins with eight factors, including “[g]enetic or
chromosomal sex” and “[h]ormonal sex.” Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female:
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 270–291
(1999) (exploring the physiological and psychological variations of sex and gender,
particularly in their relation to the law).
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of the human condition, these definitions will at least clarify the
understanding of what transgender means for the remainder of this
Comment.
There is a broad spectrum of gender identity, much of which falls well
outside the subject of this Comment. 40 Transgender, however, is often used
as an “umbrella term” for those with gender identities outside of simply
male/man or female/woman. 41 This Comment is concerned with a discrete
subset of gender possibilities outside the norm: people who present as a
gender that does not fully conform with their anatomical sex characteristics.
For example, Angie Zapata presented as a female but had male sex organs.
Similarly, some trans men present as male but have female sex organs. Not
all transgender people desire to have sex reassignment surgery—which
reshapes the external genitalia to conform with an individual’s gender
identity—and thus there is a community which will persist in not
conforming to the gender/sex expectations of a heteronormative society.
Even for those transgender people who do have sex reassignment surgery or
surgeries, many non-sex characteristics—such as facial shape, voice, and
stature—are not changed by surgery. 42 Angie Zapata was a pre-operative
transsexual because she had not undergone sex reassignment surgery before
she was murdered; she was also transgender, and would remain so after any
surgery. 43 Although scholars, journalists, and commentators use different
terms in referring to individuals whose gender presentation does not match
their anatomical sex, this Comment will use the term transgender to signify
all people whose presented gender (clothing, hair, carriage, etc.) does not
conform to their anatomical sex at birth.44

40
In addition to transgender people who feel strongly that their physical sex does not
match their gender identity—whether transgender women or transgender men—there are
also numerous other “others.” To consider only a few examples, there are intersex people,
who identify as neither fully male nor fully female, and people with additional chromosomes
beyond XX or XY. For a more in-depth discussion of the intersection of law and gender, see
Greenberg, supra note 39, at 270–78.
41
Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and
Heteronormativity, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 123, 142 (2001).
42
Id. Professor Weiss puts it eloquently: “An identity cannot be created by surgical
means.” Id.
43
See generally id. at 142–43.
44
Some cited sources differ in their terminology. While the distinctions and
commonalities between trans men or trans women, transgender people, and transsexuals are
important to much scholarship on gender identity, the legal argument made here applies to
everyone whose gender identity differs in some way from their anatomical sex. References
in quoted sources which use other terminology are read here to include the broadest possible
range of subjects, corresponding with this Comment’s definition of transgender.
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IV. THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE
Traditionally, the provocation defense has been used by defendants
charged with murder in situations where it is understandable that they might
be in an abnormal mental state.45 This Part will explore the traditional
application of the provocation defense before examining the development
of the gay panic defense as a specific form of the provocation defense. It
will then discuss how the gay panic framework has been extended to cases
with transgender murder victims.
In essence, the provocation defense is simple: when a defendant kills
in the heat of passion, what would normally be considered murder—absent
mental turmoil—is mitigated to manslaughter. The defense is generally
justified by looking at the mental state of the actor. 46 Killing with
premeditation is found to be more morally offensive than killing without
premeditation or killing in a reason-clouding rage. 47 To use the common
law provocation defense, the defendant must show that the killing was
motivated by legally adequate provocation, which did in fact cause a heat of
passion, which had not receded by the time of the killing. 48 These common
law features are incorporated into most state provocation statutes.49
Generally, the legal adequacy of provocation is determined using the
reasonable person standard, under which provocation is “considered legally
adequate if the reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have been
provoked into a heat of passion.” 50
The Model Penal Code (MPC) diverges from the objectivity of the
reasonable person standard to incorporate consideration of the defendant’s
subjective mental state via the extreme emotional disturbance test. The
MPC prescribes that “a homicide which would otherwise be murder is
[mitigated if] committed under the influence of an extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse.” 51 The MPC offers this gloss: “The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
45
The full history and theory of the provocation defense is well outside the scope of this
Comment. For an overview, see generally Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A
Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
46
See generally id.
47
Id. at 436–43.
48
Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as
Insufficient Provocation, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 133, 140 (1992). See generally WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §15.2(b), at 777 (4th ed. 2003).
49
Mison, supra note 48, at 140.
50
See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 500 (2008).
51
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001).
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the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”52
Under both the prevailing reasonable person standard and the MPC
approach, however, the ultimate arbiter of adequate provocation is the factfinder, not the defendant.
A. GAY PANIC: A MODEL?

In a groundbreaking comment published in 1992, Robert B. Mison
outlined an argument for judicial invalidation of what was then a frequently
employed variation of the provocation defense: the so-called homosexual
advance defense. 53 He asked a simple question: “Should a nonviolent
sexual advance in and of itself constitute sufficient provocation to incite a
reasonable man to lose his self-control and kill in the heat of passion?” 54
The stories he recounted stretch the outer limit of plausibility.
Mison looked first at the words of judges. He recounted the story of
Broward County, Florida Circuit Judge Daniel Futch, who presided over a
criminal trial arising out of the beating of Daniel Wan by a group of men
who called Wan “faggot” while kicking him and “[throwing] him against a
moving vehicle.” 55 At a pretrial hearing, Judge Futch “jokingly asked the
prosecuting attorney, ‘That’s a crime now, to beat up a homosexual?’” 56
Later, Mison turns from judges to criminals. He recounts the story of
Schick v. State, where a younger man, hitchhiking with an older man, asks
the older man where he can find someone to perform oral sex. 57 The older
man offers to do it and the two buy cigarettes together before
consummating the act in a dark baseball field. 58 Then, the young man
“kicks [the older man], stomps on him, takes his money, and leaves the
victim to die.” 59 After a trial where the younger man claimed that the older
man’s “homosexual advance” had caused him to lose all self-control, the
jury found the defendant guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. 60 Mison

52

Id.
See Mison, supra note 48, at 136.
54
Id. at 133–34.
55
Id. at 163 (citing Suzanne Bryant, Nat’l Lesbian & Gay Law Ass’n, Remarks before
the A.B.A. Judicial Conduct Subcommittee (Sept. 22, 1989)).
56
Id.
57
Mison, supra note 48, at 134–35; see Schick v. State, 570 N.E.2d 918, 921–22 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991).
58
Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 921–22.
59
Mison, supra note 48, at 135.
60
Id. (citing Schick, 570 N.E.2d at 922).
53
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documented several more cases 61 in which a provocation defense based on
homosexual advances was allowed—including one where the evidence
suggested that the defendant had intended to rob gay men, 62 and another in
which “homosexual paraphernalia” belonging to the victim, found under
lock and key away from the crime scene, was admitted to substantiate a
homosexual provocation defense. 63
The basic legal claim underlying the homosexual panic defense
common at the time Mison wrote, almost twenty years ago, is as follows: a
reasonable man 64 would be insulted and enraged by a nonviolent
homosexual advance and his anger would constitute legally sufficient
provocation. 65 Mison succinctly diagnoses the defendant’s goal in using the
homosexual advance defense:
In seeking to avail himself of the provocation defense the defendant hopes that the
typical American juror—a product of homophobic and heterocentric American
society—will evaluate the homosexual victim and homosexual overture with feelings
of fear, revulsion, and hatred. The defendant’s goal is to convince the jury that his
reaction was only a reflection of this visceral societal reaction; the reaction of a
66
“reasonable man.”

When Mison was writing, the connection between the homosexual
panic defense and widespread revulsion and bigotry in larger society was
practically undeniable; since that time, however, societal attitudes towards
homosexuality have been slowly changing. 67 There has also been an
outpouring of legal scholarship that has been almost uniformly critical of
the legal and moral underpinnings of the homosexual panic defense.68
61
See generally People v. Saldivar, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 1986); Schick, 570 N.E.2d at
918; Commonwealth v. Doucette, 462 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1984); Mison, supra note 48, at
167–70 (citing Mills v. Shepherd, 445 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D.N.C. 1978)).
62
Mison, supra note 48, at 167–68 (citing Mills, 445 F. Supp. at 1231).
63
Saldivar, 497 N.E.2d at 1138.
64
The defendant in a homosexual panic defense situation is almost inevitably male; in
1992, Mison failed to find a single example of a reputed lesbian panic defense. Mison,
supra note 48, at 135 n.7.
65
Id. at 155–58.
66
Id. at 158.
67
See ALISON G. KELEHER & ERIC R.A.N. SMITH, EXPLAINING THE GROWING SUPPORT
FOR GAY AND LESBIAN EQUALITY SINCE 1990, at 1 (2008), http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/
faculty/ smith/equality.pdf. “[F]rom 1973 through 1991, 70 to 78 percent of the public
thought that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex were always wrong. Then
acceptance of gays and lesbians began to grow. By 2004, the number saying that
homosexual relations were always wrong had fallen to 57 percent.” Id.
68
See, e.g., Mison, supra note 48; Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Comment, Provocation’s
Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, “Homosexual Panic,” and the Non-Violent
Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195 (2000); Kara S.
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Noting the improvement in attitudes towards homosexuals as well as
potential problems with a ban on the gay panic defense, 69 one prominent
legal scholar has even advocated against attempts to restrict use of the gay
panic defense in the courtroom. 70 Additionally, thirty states and the District
of Columbia have enacted hate crimes laws that explicitly sanction felonies
committed in part because of bias against homosexuality71—now joined by
the federal government. 72 The increasing intervention by state and federal
law against entrenched homophobic violence has not, however, led to the
disappearance of anti-gay violence or the killing of homosexuals. If
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are not safe despite an improving legal
environment, what hope do transgender people have?
B. TRANS PANIC: PUTTING THE “T” IN MITIGATION

While the gay panic defense has a history dating back at least to the
early twentieth century, 73 documentation of murders of transgender people
date back only to the 1970s. 74 As transgender people have become
increasingly visible, their presence in courts has become more marked.
Courts, which only recently struggled to incorporate the possibility of samesex attraction, must now also handle transgender victims and defendants
claiming they killed in a state of trans panic.75 In many ways, the trans
Suffredini, Comment, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 279, 2001. But see Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill
“Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the
“Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) (responding to
Mison and arguing that Mison’s arguments suggest a wholesale repeal of the provocation
doctrine rather than merely a rejection of the homosexual panic defense, as Mison argued).
69
See infra text accompanying notes 181–182; Mison, supra note 48, at 174–78.
70
Lee, supra note 50, at 521–57.
71
Nat’l Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Hate Crime Laws in the U.S., July 14, 2009,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/hate_crimes_7_09_color.pdf.
72
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009).
73
Lee, supra note 50, at 482–83.
74
TRANSGENDER DAY OF REMEMBRANCE, supra note 36. Perhaps the first case to
generate popular interest is the murder of Brandon Teena, who was killed by two men
accused of raping the trans man. Rogers Worthington, Deadly Deception; Teena Brandon’s
Double Life May Have Led to a Triple Murder, CHI. TRIB., January 17, 1994, at TEMPO-1.
Teena’s death inspired the film Boys Don’t Cry. Roger Ebert, Boys Don’t Cry,
ROGEREBERT.COM
(Oct.
22,
1999),
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/19991022/REVIEWS/910220302/1023.
75
In addition to Angie Zapata, the murders of Gwen Araujo and Lateisha Green attracted
significant media attention. See Kate Linthicum, Conviction in Killing of Transgender
Woman, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2009, at A11. See generally Wyatt Buchanan, Transgender
Killings an Investigative Quagmire, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 2005, at A1. There are
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panic defense is similar to gay panic; both assert that the defendant had his
heterosexuality or masculinity so existentially challenged by the victim that
the defendant acted without reason. 76 Trans panic defenses add an
additional claim, however, which is critical to this Comment’s analysis:
they assert that the victim misled the defendant. Describing the trans panic
defense used in the Gwen Araujo 77 trial, Victoria L. Steinberg writes:
Above all, defense counsel argued that Araujo’s commission of “sexual fraud”
constituted sufficient provocation . . . . While burying Araujo, one defendant said that
“he could not believe that someone could ever be so deceitful. By being deceitful, he
meant having sex with someone who thought it [sic] was a woman, not simply
78
presenting as a woman when the person was actually a man.”

This closely parallels the claims made by Allen Andrade in his defense—
that he was shocked by the “revelation” of Zapata’s anatomical sex.
In both the Aruajo and Zapata cases, the defendants claimed they had
been deceived about the victim’s “sex.” In his trial for murdering Angie
Zapata, Andrade’s defense team told the jury, “He had been deceived, and
he reacted.” 79 Andrade claimed he was convinced that Angie was female
until immediately before he killed her; when he learned about her
anatomical sex, he flew into a rage. Gwen Aruajo’s killers made similar
claims, asserting that they were deceived. One of the accused’s lawyers
told the jury, “This crime didn’t occur because Mike [the defendant] had a
bias. It happened because of the discovery of what Eddie [Gwen] had
done . . . . This is a case that tells a story about . . . the tragic results when
that deception and betrayal were discovered [by the defendant].”80 In both
undoubtedly other trials (given that the violent killing of almost 300 transgender people has
been documented in the last forty years) but many, if not most, escape meaningful media
attention.
76
For an overview of the gay panic defense, see supra text accompanying notes 53–66.
For an overview of the trans panic defense, see Victoria L. Steinberg, Book Review, A Heat
of Passion Offense: Emotions and Bias in “Trans Panic” Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 499, 520 (2005) (reviewing MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY
(2004)).
77
Gwen Araujo was murdered in 2002 after a group of young men with whom she had
engaged in oral sex discovered that she was anatomically male. She was supposedly beaten
with “a can and a skillet” and strangled to death. See generally Kelly St. John, Defense in
Araujo Trial Gives Final Argument, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 2004, at B1.
78
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 520 (citing Memorandum of Law from Michael P.
Thorman to Alameda Super. Ct. in Support of Motion to Set Aside Hate Clause Allegation
and Information Pursuant to Penal Code § 995, Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at
7–9, People v. Magidson, No. H-33728C (Super Ct. Cal. June 25, 2003)). Here, Steinberg
quotes from the defense attorney’s written assertion of the trans panic defense.
79
Dunn, supra note 12, at A1.
80
Vicki Haddock, ‘Gay Panic’ Defense in Araujo Case, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 2004, at
E1.
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cases, the defense suggested that the killer thought he was intimate with a
woman/female. Thus, the revelation that, from the defendant’s perspective
at least, they had been intimate with a trans woman—decidedly not a person
with the anatomical sex in which heterosexuality dictated that the defendant
be interested—would be shocking.
Existing legal scholarship on trans panic defenses in murder cases is
scant. The literature criticizing trans panic defenses includes a book review
which argues that courts should not give jury instructions based on the trans
panic defense 81 and a student comment calling for the legislative abolition
of gay and trans panic defenses in California.82 On the other hand, one
commentator argues that “sexual misrepresentation,” including the
situations involving transgender people considered here, should constitute
adequate provocation for the provocation defense to apply. 83 Given that
trans panic defenses are already being asserted in criminal courtrooms and
that many thousands of Americans identify as transgender, 84 it is important
for the criminal law to keep pace with cultural change.
In its present form, the trans panic defense is often asserted
explicitly—the defendant argues that he was extraordinarily provoked and
that he should be punished more leniently because of his state of mind. 85
Other defendants do not explicitly argue for leniency; they instead seek to
impeach the victim’s humanity and diminish the sympathy that jurors feel
for the victim. 86 The trans panic defense strategy, whether explicit or

81

Steinberg, supra note 76, at 520.
David L. Annicchiarico, Comment, Consistency, Integrity and Equal Justice: A
Proposal to Rid California Law of the LGBT Panic Defense, 5 DUKEMINIER AWARDS 121
(2006). Annicchiarico addresses the trans panic defense in issuing a compelling call for a
legislative ban on defenses related to “LGBT panic” in California. He references the murder
of Gwen Aruajo but does not make a distinction between trans and gay panic—nor does his
argument address assertions of deception related to sex or gender by defendants.
83
Bradford Bigler, Sexually Provoked: Recognizing Sexual Misrepresentation as
Adequate Provocation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 783 (2006).
84
Olyslager and Conway estimate that up to 1 in 500 people are transsexual and 1 in 100
people are transgender. In the United States, this would indicate 600,000 transsexual people
and 3,000,000 transgender people. FEMKE OLYSLAGER & LYNN CONWAY, ON THE
CALCULATION OF THE PREVALENCE OF TRANSSEXUALISM 23 (2007), http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/
people/conway/TS/Prevalence/Reports/Prevalence%20of%20Transsexualism.pdf.
85
This is the argument made in the Araujo case. See generally Haddock, supra note 80,
at E1.
86
Allen Andrade’s defense team utilized this tactic, referring to Angie Zapata by her
legal male name, Justin. Dunn, supra note 2. This less explicit appeal to juror bias is a
major worry for Professor Lee, whose work suggests that defense lawyers will increasingly
use these “coded” arguments if an explicit provocation defense is denied. See Lee, supra
note 50, at 522–31.
82
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implicit, “resonate[s] with juries that harbor biases, misinformation, or
confusion about transgendered individuals.” 87
As a legal matter, the trans panic defense fails to prove that
transgender victims offer legally adequate provocation; indeed, the “sexual
deception” alleged in nearly all trans panic defenses is not culpable under
most states’ rape laws. 88 Additionally, rejecting the trans panic defense
comports with a principled commitment to recognize the autonomy of
individuals with respect to their gender. Ensuring that the trans panic
defense is no longer welcome anywhere in the United States will require a
wide range of strategies: legislative enactments in some states, judicial
action in others, and aggressive action by prosecutors everywhere.
V. TRANS PANIC AS INADEQUATE PROVOCATION
The unfortunate fact is that trans panic sometimes works in the
courtroom. Perhaps the most egregious example of an explicit and
successful trans panic defense is the 1997 trial of William Palmer, who,
after meeting Chanelle Pickett in a bar, beat and choked her for eight
minutes, killing her.89 The jury acquitted Palmer of the three more serious
charges—first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary
manslaughter—finding him guilty only of assault and battery. 90 Thus
Palmer, who claimed that he reacted to Pickett’s anatomical sex being
revealed, was convicted only for attacking Pickett, not killing her.91 As
transgender activist Nancy Nangeroni said at the time, “It really speaks to
the fact that being transsexual means being less of a person . . . . Rich,
white boy kills poor black transsexual girl, and the white boy gets a slap on
the wrist.” 92

87

Steinberg, supra note 76, at 521.
Cf. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 830–31 (1988).
89
Francie Latour, Sibling Decries Murder Acquittal; Verdict is Assault in Transsexual’s
Death, BOS. GLOBE, May 3, 1997, at B1.
90
Id.
91
Id. Palmer’s lawyers suggested that he did not kill Pickett, and that she died, instead,
of a cocaine overdose. The medical examiner refuted that speculation, testifying that “the
levels of cocaine found in [Pickett’s] body were too low to have contributed significantly to
[her] death.” Id.
92
Id. Nangeroni’s blunt but truthful assessment of the Palmer trial recognizes that race,
ethnicity, and class are always intertwined with sex, gender, and gender identity. Angie
Zapata was an Hispanic trans woman killed by a white man, for example. The ties between
sex and gender markers, on one hand, and race, ethnicity and class, on the other, are beyond
the scope of this Comment, however.
88

1672

MORGAN TILLEMAN

[Vol. 100

While the reduction in sentence achieved by Palmer is more dramatic
than in many other uses of the trans panic defense, 93 the outlines of his
defense are similar to those which still occur. His three-year sentence is an
outlier, but any mitigation is a boon to a defendant facing a murder
charge. 94 Securing even an outside chance to be convicted of manslaughter
rather than murder would be a success for a defendant facing evidence like
that presented against Angie Zapata’s killer.
Although they have been effective in the courtroom, trans panic
defenses fail to assert a legally sufficient provocation, and thus should be
rejected at trial. Courts generally allow mitigation defenses only in cases
where the facts support a cognizable and legally adequate claim of
provocation. 95 All varieties of the trans panic defense fail to prove that the
defendant was provoked in a way that is cognizable as legally sufficient.
The trans panic defense seeks to assert that the transgender victim
provoked a murderous attack on him- or herself. There are two possible
routes for making this claim: a claim of justification96 or a claim of
excuse. 97 Reviewing the history of provocation defenses, Professor
Dressler points out, “All of the common law forms of ‘adequate
provocation’ have one thing in common; they all involve unlawful conduct
by the provoker.” 98 These categories originally included finding a spouse
committing adultery in delicto and seeing a friend or family member being
assaulted. 99 In contrast, contemporary understandings of provocation are
based in an objective consideration of the defendant’s mental state. Modern
93
Angie Zapata’s killer was convicted of first-degree murder, and the killers of Gwen
Araujo of manslaughter. Dunn, supra note 31; Henry K. Lee, 2 Guilty in 2nd Degree in
Araujo Slaying, S. F. CHRON. Sept. 13, 2005, at A1.
94
Latour, supra note 89, at B1.
95
See generally Dressler, supra note 45, at 429–32.
96
See generally Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The
Reasonableness of the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1024–36 (1958)
(exploring the common law analysis underlying traditional categories of sufficient
provocation).
97
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001) (explaining that “extreme mental or
emotional disturbance” which influence a killer can mitigate murder to manslaughter); see,
e.g., Crane v. State, 685 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that “engaging
[defendant] in a dangerous road race and threatening to kill him; throwing an object at
[defendant’s] truck; . . . forcibly striking the window two or three times; and taunting
[defendant] to shoot . . . supplied sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for
voluntary manslaughter”).
98
Dressler, supra note 45, at 439. Adultery has been decriminalized, so perhaps a more
accurate reading is historically unlawful behavior gives rise to adequate provocation.
99
Id. See also Regina v. Mawgridge, Kel. J. 119, 128, reprinted in 84 Eng. Rep. 1107,
1111 (Q.B. 1707) (finding that throwing a bottle at accused was not adequate provocation
because it was “justifiable and lawful”).
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provocation doctrine places the reasonable man in the defendant’s situation
and asks whether the reasonable man would be provoked. 100 In both cases,
however, the primary consideration is objective: would a reasonable person
be adequately provoked to kill? 101
Trans panic defenses often leave the exact provocation unstated, but
the defense seems to break down into three possible “triggers,” each of
which could constitute the source of adequate provocation: (1) the victim’s
anatomical sex, (2) the revelation of the victim’s anatomical sex, and (3) the
victim’s alleged act of “sexual deception.”102 None of these three triggers
constitutes legally adequate provocation.
A. ANATOMICAL SEX

The first alleged trigger for the trans panic defense is the difference
between the victim’s anatomical sex and gender presentation. Claiming this
difference as the basis for adequate provocation does not meet the general
requirement that the victim act in provoking a murderous reaction. 103
Araujo’s killer implicitly claimed that Araujo’s identity—that of a person
who felt herself female despite having male genitalia—was in and of itself
sufficient to provoke a response. 104 This claim moves beyond the
mainstream of provocation law to baldly state that transgender people’s
anatomical sex qua sex is provocation without any action. 105

100
See generally Dressler, supra note 45. Some states and the Model Penal Code add a
secondary subjective consideration; they place the reasonable man in the defendant’s
situation as he saw it and ask if the provocation was sufficient. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 632(2) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-205.5(4) (2009); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2001).
101
For both approaches, the threshold issue is whether provocation was legally
sufficient. The difference is in how that threshold is crossed—by a specific occurrence
(under the common law approach) or by the determination of the defendant’s state of mind
(under the MPC approach).
102
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 508.
103
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY 128–29 (2004).
104
See Steinberg, supra note 76, at 509.
105
It might alternatively be claimed that the juxtaposition of sex and gender presented to
the killer is the source of claimed provocation. To view the trigger in this way may not
accurately reflect the whole of trans identity, but in either case, the claimed provocation is
inherent to the trans victim. Whether the killer claims that he (or she) was provoked by the
victim’s sex or its contrast with the victim’s gender presentation, the victim does nothing to
the killer. Only by claiming that transgender identity is a form of deception at all times
could the killer argue that his (or her) victim did anything to provoke a murderous rage. This
argument, while undoubtedly intelligible, must be rejected if transgender people are taken as
acceptable in society.
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The implications of accepting transgender people’s anatomical sex as
provocation are broad and troubling. As Victoria L. Steinberg writes, “To
expand the definition of sufficient provocation to include a person’s
characteristics would open the door to justifying mitigation for murder of
anyone that a killer . . . dislikes, feels uncomfortable interacting with, or
finds disgusting.” 106 If distaste or disapproval of a person’s gender identity
is sufficient to excuse murder by the provocation defense, then other kinds
of strong disapproval may also justify a provocation defense. In the past,
claims of provocation with their roots in disgust of Jews, African
Americans, or the physically handicapped were regularly accepted. 107
Today, however, such defenses are found to be morally repugnant and are
Rejection of claims of provocation by
not admitted in court.108
“Jewishness” or race flows from a recognition that such provocation stems
not from reason but from prejudice; the reasonable person is generally taken
to represent our better urges as a society, not just as a representation of the
feelings of an “ordinary” person. 109
Here, some point to hate crimes laws that express society’s disapproval
as implying that courts must reject gay panic defenses. 110 The federal hate
crimes law, enacted in 2009, is important as a statement of principle, but
does not alone overcome the persistence of the trans panic defense. In New
York, Dwight DeLee was prosecuted under hate crime statutes for the
killing of LaTeisha Green, a trans woman, but was only found guilty of
manslaughter, not murder. 111 Green was at a house party with her brother,

106

Steinberg, supra note 76, at 508.
NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 134.
108
Id.
109
Lee, supra note 50, at 506. This argument encapsulates the force of history that
mitigates in favor of ending use of the trans panic defenses.
110
Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes Statutes:
Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629 (2001) (arguing that allowing gay
panic defenses is philosophically inconsistent with a hate crime law which expresses societal
sentiment that crimes motivated by sexual orientation are in some way more culpable than
the same criminal act without prejudice as a motivating factor). McCoy does not address
trans panic defenses, but his logic seems to easily extend to hate crimes laws which are
inclusive of gender identity.
111
Jim O’Hara, Hate-Crime Killer Receives 25-Year Term, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse,
N.Y.), August 19, 2009, at A6. There is a tortured logic to the coexistence of gay or trans
panic defenses and hate crimes laws. The combination recognizes the historic prejudice
faced by LGBT people while also recognizing a diminished mental state—the very purpose
claimed for provocation defenses. In essence, DeLee’s conviction says: We understand that
he acted under extreme emotional disturbance which was a response to Green’s gender
identity or sexuality and thus cannot hold him accountable for murder, but we also find his
disgust antisocial and want to combat it by enhancing his manslaughter penalty.
107
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where several other guests shouted homophobic slurs at her. Later, she was
outside the party in a car with her brother when DeLee approached the car
and fired a single shot from a .22-caliber rifle, killing her.112 New York has
a hate crimes law that includes sexual orientation, but does not cover gender
identity. 113 Prosecutors successfully contended that, because of the
homophobic slurs, the killing was related to Green’s sexuality and tried the
case as a hate crime. 114 The case was only the second in the United States
in which hate crimes statutes were used in the prosecution of a crime
against a transgender person. 115
Many of the trans panic defenses documented in the media claim that
the killer was provoked by the transgender victim’s anatomical sex.
Allowing transgender people’s existence—which inherently includes
inconsistency between gender and anatomical sex—to constitute adequate
provocation is counter to the general requirement that provocation be an
affirmative act by the victim 116 and opens the door to other characteristicmotivated provocation defenses. The claim that transgender people’s
anatomical sex is a provocation has no legal validity; the victim does
nothing to provoke a response, let alone a murderous one.
B. REVELATION OF ANATOMICAL SEX

Defendants using a trans panic defense often claim, whether implicitly
or explicitly, that the victim’s revelation of his or her anatomical sex—
which does not strictly conform with his or her gender presentation—
constitutes adequate provocation. Known cases do not include such
revelations, and even were a revelation to occur, it would constitute a
speech act that courts ought to protect, not cast as provocation.117 In the
cases considered here, the victims did not proactively reveal their own
anatomical sex to their killers. Angie Zapata pointedly refused to answer
questions about her anatomical sex and Allen Andrade groped her to
confirm his suspicion that she had a penis. 118 The “revelation” in the

It is not clear from limited media coverage whether DeLee’s attorneys made any explicit
trans panic claims in his defense, but the situation is certainly one in which LaTeisha
Green’s gender identity could subconsciously influence jurors in deciding on which charge
to convict.
112
Linthicum, supra note 75, at A11.
113
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2009).
114
Linthicum, supra note 75, at A11.
115
Id.
116
NUSSBAUM, supra note 103, at 128–29.
117
See infra text accompanying notes 121–124.
118
See supra text accompanying notes 15–17.
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Araujo case was even less voluntary: “[T]he defendants harassed Araujo to
determine her sex, ultimately throwing her to the ground and pulling off her
clothing to reveal her genitals.” 119 If, for purposes of argument, a
transgender person’s affirmative revelation of anatomical sex could
constitute adequate provocation, that situation has yet to arise in a
publicized case. 120
Even in the hypothetical situation in which a transgender person
affirmatively reveals his or her anatomical sex and thereby contributes to
another person’s murderous rage, that revelation should not constitute
adequate provocation. Instead, it should be read as a speech act—what Nan
Hunter calls “expressive identity.” 121 Conceived of as speech, the
revelation of a transgender person’s anatomical sex becomes political as
well as personal. 122 Political statements are generally not read as adequate
provocation, unless they also incorporate fighting words. 123 Indeed, were a
court to allow the mere statement that one’s gender and anatomical sex do
119

Steinberg, supra note 76, at 509.
Recognizing that truth is often stranger than fiction, this Comment does not suggest
such a situation is impossible—merely improbable. Trans people are generally cautious
about revealing such information casually, and for good reason. Transgender people were
the victims of 12% of bias crimes against the LGBT community in 2007. NAT'L COALITION
OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2008), available at http://www.ncavp.org/
common/document_files/Reports/2008 HV Report smaller file.pdf. Other considerations
suggest that, were such an improbability to occur, that such a revelation would still not
constitute adequate provocation. See infra Part V.C.
121
Nan Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that for groups whose identity is central to a political claim—
for example, transgender people claiming equal protection—there is case law suggesting that
identity itself is expressive speech).
Are transgender people’s identities intentional enough to constitute expressive speech? It
has never been tested at trial or on appeal, but a well-developed identity politics, recognizing
the inherently political nature of personal status,suggests that they may be. Further
consideration of this issue is well outside the scope of this Comment, however.
122
Id. at 4–6.
123
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 562 (1942) (“There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include . . .
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.”). A statement like those envisioned as constituting
provocation here—“I am transgender,” or “I may appear female to you but I have male
genitalia”—does not analogize to well-known fighting words, which directly insult the
listener. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court limited the reach of “fighting words” by
requiring that they “could reasonably have [been] regarded . . . as a direct personal insult” or
as “intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction.” 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
Statements of transgender identity are far from this standard, however it might be
interpreted.
120
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not align in the typical way to serve as adequate provocation, essentially, it
would be declaring that all openly transgender people provoke the
reasonable person to a murderous rage merely by their existence.124
Past cases suggest that defendants seeking to use the trans panic
defense proactively seek out information regarding their victims’
anatomical sex, rendering the revelation of that information inadequate
provocation because the victim does not act towards the defendant. Even
were there to be a situation in which a transgender person revealed their
anatomical sex and was killed as a result, considerations of speech and
identity politics suggest that the only just response would be for courts to
find the genital revelation inadequate provocation.
Claims that the anatomical sex of a transgender person constitutes
adequate provocation fail because the victim does not act. Recognizing a
person’s innate or chosen characteristics as legally cognizable adequate
provocation leads to an absurd and undesirable result: the
institutionalization of bias as legitimization for violent crime. Even if the
argument attempts to shift the alleged provocation from a transgender
person’s existence to his or her revelation of their gender identity, the same
concerns apply; recognizing the revelation of one’s transgender status as
adequate provocation makes living as a transgender person adequate
provocation as well. The allegation that a transgender person’s “sexual
deception” constitutes adequate provocation, however, is not so obviously
deficient. It offers perhaps the most viable path to a successful provocation
defense in trans panic cases, although it fails just as claims stemming from
the victim’s gender identity do.
C. SEXUAL DECEPTION

The third and ultimate legal claim made in trans panic defenses is that
the transgender victim committed a vaguely defined sexual fraud in failing
to reveal their anatomical sex to the defendant. 125 This fraud allegedly
provides the adequate provocation that substantiates the trans panic defense
and secures mitigation to manslaughter. The defendants accused of
murdering Angie Zapata and Gwen Aruajo both explicitly claimed that they
had been deceived.126 The alleged deception was crucial for the
124

This Comment cannot and does not prove the political import of transgender people’s
existence. However, combating the trans panic defense is an inherently political act,
concerned with society’s understanding of gender identity and its respect for that identity.
Making political claims may be difficult, but is unavoidable when making identity-based
arguments, as here. Hunter, supra note 121, at 4–6.
125
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 510–11.
126
See supra text accompanying notes 22–24, 80–81.

1678

MORGAN TILLEMAN

[Vol. 100

provocation claimed by these male defendants. From their perspective,
sexual intimacy with a person perceived as female was acceptable, but
sexual intimacy with anyone with male anatomical sex characteristics was
an affront sufficient to provoke a homicidal rage. 127 Being induced into a
sexual act by a person they perceive as female (but who is, for them,
“actually” male because of anatomical sex) is the alleged trigger for
adequate provocation.
Allegations of fraud are serious business, and they arise surprisingly
frequently in other sexual contexts.128 To substantiate the claim of adequate
provocation by sexual deception or sexual fraud 129 central to the trans panic
defense, defendants must first show that there is in fact fraud, and second,
they must demonstrate that the fraud alleged is legally blameworthy. 130 As
this section will demonstrate, neither fraud nor deception as alleged in the
trans panic defense constitute legally adequate provocation.
The claim of fraud presupposes the existence of a “material fact that
one has a duty to reveal” and harm done by a misrepresentation of that
fact. 131 For the claims made about sexual misrepresentation in the trans
panic defense to constitute fraud, both the transgender person’s gender and
anatomical sex must be material to the decision to engage in the sexual act,
and the transgender person must have a duty to reveal that fact to their
killer. 132 Since neither of these propositions is true, as argued below, it
follows that there is no sexual fraud or deception when a transgender person
does not reveal their anatomical sex to a sexual partner.
A person’s anatomical sex is not a material fact capable of being
misrepresented in most sexual relationships, including those which give rise
127
In the one well-documented case involving a transgender man, Brandon Teena, the
claims of the defendants are much less clear; they were accused of raping Teena in the weeks
preceding his death, and records of their exact defenses in court are scant. See Worthington,
supra note 74, at TEMPO-1.
128
See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 49
(1998) (reviewing the legal treatment of deception across a broad spectrum of sexual
encounters).
129
The distinction between sexual fraud and sexual misrepresentation is blurry at best.
Since much of the contemporary application of the trans panic defense is at the level of
appealing to bias rather than legal argumentation, the precise distinction does not affect the
analysis that follows. Deception, misrepresentation, and fraud are, in this context,
interchangeable.
130
Cf. Chamallas, supra note 88, at 830–33 (suggesting that rape by fraud is not
prosecuted because courts are reluctant to become judges of which frauds are material to
consent and because “the man who lies to get his way is less blameworthy than one who
resorts to physical force”).
131
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 511.
132
Id.
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to assertions of the trans panic defense. Either the transgender person’s
genitals are irrelevant to the sexual act or acts that occur, or the transgender
person’s genitals are exposed to his or her sexual partner in the course of
sex acts. In neither the Zapata nor the Araujo case was there genital-togenital contact or even exposure of the transgender person’s genitals.133
Although people may make assumptions about the anatomical sex of those
with whom they have sexual interactions that do not involve genital contact,
the anatomical sex of an oral sex partner, for example, is immaterial to the
contemplated sex act. Either the sexual act is consummated without both
parties’ genitals being involved—as is frequently the case when oral sex is
performed on a male, where the female (or trans woman’s) genitals are not
involved in the act—or the sexual act involves genital contact, in which
case no deception regarding anatomical sex is possible because the genitals
of both participants are exposed.
The trans panic defense necessarily implies that transgender people
deceive their sexual partners even when the transgender person’s genitals
are not involved in the sexual act. This “leads inevitably to the conclusion
that a person has a duty to reveal their genitals, or verbally communicate the
nature of their biological sex to one with whom they are intimate.” 134 One
of the defendants in the Araujo case made just such a claim: “[A]
heterosexual male has a right to . . . choose the gender of his partners . . .
Eddie [Gwen] Araujo took away that choice by deception.” 135 Leaving
aside the fact that Gwen Araujo’s gender was female, one party’s
preferences do not impose any obligation on others to voluntarily disclose
their anatomical sex, any more than a person is obligated to disclose any
other relevant genital characteristic. For example, although this seems
likely to be less important today than in the past, 136 society persists in
valuing female virginity. 137 Despite that subjective value, the condition of a
133
Andrade claimed that he received oral sex from Zapata, but no other sexual contact,
including any where Zapata’s genitals would be touched or even visible, occurred. See
Correll, supra note 3, at A3. One juror recounted that Araujo had anal sex with her killers.
Brian Kluepfel, Left Hanging, EAST BAY EXPRESS (May 11, 2005),
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/eastbay/left-hanging/Content?oid=1077790.
She also
insisted that her genitals not be touched during sexual acts. Haddock, supra note 80, at E1.
134
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 511.
135
Kelly St. John, Nature of Killing Focus at End of Araujo Case, S. F. CHRON., June 1,
2004, at B1.
136
See, e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 465–66
(2000) (noting that seduction in breach of promise to marry, a crime which was in part
defined by the loss of the female’s virginity, “probably has become much less common” in
contemporary America).
137
See, e.g., DANIEL L. CHEN, GENDER VIOLENCE AND THE PRICE OF VIRGINITY: THEORY
AND EVIDENCE OF INCOMPLETE MARRIAGE CONTRACTS 2 (2005), available at
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woman’s hymen, which is commonly but erroneously perceived as a
signifier of her virginity, 138 would not constitute adequate provocation even
if that condition did not align with her professed virginity. 139 Further, were
courts to implicitly impose such a standard by finding that failure to reveal
one’s anatomical sex constituted adequate provocation, it would encounter
substantial difficulties in defining sex.140
Courts have been hesitant to intrude into the historically private zone
of consensual sexual interactions when considering claims of fraud. 141
They have refused to consider fraud or misrepresentation regarding birth
control use 142 and prior homosexual experience. 143 The existing policy
seems both practical and wise; the creation of judicial standards for
revealing personal information in the context of romantic or sexual relations
is fraught with difficulty. Because a person’s anatomical sex is not material
information prior to genital contact, at which point a person’s anatomical
sex is necessarily revealed, failure by a transgender person to disclose their
anatomical sex cannot be legally recognized as fraud. Nor is there any duty
to give notice about one’s genitals.
In considering the intersection of fraud, misrepresentation, deception,
and sex, rape law offers a rich source of legal theory. There may be a trend
towards greater acceptance of tort claims arising from deception in intimate
relationships, but the criminal law is much less open to claims of rape by
fraud. 144 There are several general situations, however, in which fraud used
to secure consent is legally culpable: fraudulent medical treatment, fraud as

http://home.uchicago.edu/~dlc/papers/GenderViolence_PriceOfVirginity.pdf (noting that
asymmetrical values of virginity, which place a greater value on female virginity, persist
across time and income changes).
138
Cf. SALLY E. PERLMAN ET AL., CLINICAL PROTOCOLS IN PEDIATRIC AND ADOLESCENT
GYNECOLOGY 131 (2004).
139
While the concept of rape by fraud or deception perpetrated by women has
undoubtedly not received the same degree of attention as that perpetrated by males,
Professor Falk’s survey of cases of rape by fraud does not mention virginity. Falk, supra
note 128, at 49–76 (collecting a representative selection of cases where convictions were
obtained for rape by fraud).
140
Although the popular conception of sex is of a binary, male–female divide, the reality
is much more complicated. There are intersex people, who are born with some male and
some female characteristics, as well as those with non-standard chromosomes. What to
disclose, and how, would be a major problem. See generally Greenberg, supra note 39.
141
Steinberg, supra note 76, at 512.
142
Id. (citing Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(rejecting a misrepresentation claim about the use of birth control)).
143
See Woy v. Woy, 737 S.W.2d 769, 773–74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding wife had no
duty to reveal lesbian sexual activity engaged in prior to heterosexual marriage).
144
Chamallas, supra note 88, at 830–31.
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to the defendant’s identity, and sexual scams involving sex as a means to
secure a career (usually in entertainment). 145 Each of these categories is
connected by a theory of “fraud in the factum,” where the victim is
deceived as to the nature of the act. 146 If these fact patterns appeared in
sexual relationships in which a transgender person commits fraud, the
victim would have a justified claim of sexual fraud which would constitute
adequate provocation. A transgender doctor who induces consent by
pretending to be offering medical treatment while in fact committing a sex
act would be guilty of rape by fraud.147 This scenario, however, bears no
resemblance to the fact patterns that lead to the trans panic defense. Merely
failing to disclose anatomical sex is not fraud in the factum. 148
The claims of “sexual deception” made by defendants asserting a trans
panic defense bear more resemblance to the theoretical concept of fraud in
the inducement than they do to fraud in the factum. From the killer’s
perspective, a transgender victim may have induced consent to a sexual
encounter through deception about their anatomical sex.149 As Martha
Chamallas succinctly explains, however, “[f]alse promises of marriage,
false representations of sterility, or false professions of love will not vitiate
the deceived party’s consent, even if the consenting party would never have
agreed to the encounter if the truth were told.”150 Even if one accepts that a
transgender person does deceive a sexual partner about his or her
anatomical sex, the consent obtained thereby would be valid because the
transgender person’s genitals are not integral to consent for sex acts that do
not involve those genitals. 151 Anatomical sex is not involved in consent to
145
Falk, supra note 128, at 49–76 (collecting a representative selection of cases where
convictions were obtained for rape by fraud).
146
Chamallas, supra note 88, at 831 n.224. “Fraud in the factum typically denotes a
situation in which the victim consents to the doing of act X and the perpetrator of the fraud,
in the guise of doing act X, actually does act Y.” Id.
147
Fraudulent medical treatment is perhaps an archetype of rape by fraud. See generally
Falk, supra note 128, at 52–58 (outlining cases of rape by doctors achieved through fraud).
148
Consenting to “sex act X with a woman” rather than “sex act X with a trans woman
who possesses male genitals” would not be fraud in the factum, however discordant it might
be for a presumably heterosexual person. Fraud in the factum is focused on lack of consent
to the sex act. If a man (or woman) consented to a sex act with a transgender person, the
anatomical sex of the transgender person is irrelevant for considerations of fraud in the
factum.
149
Indeed, Andrade and Araujo’s killers both made similar claims. See supra text
accompanying notes 22–24, 79.
150
Chamallas, supra note 88, at 832.
151
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 215 (3d ed. 1982)
(“[C]onsent induced by fraud is as effective as any other consent . . . if the deception relates
not to the thing done but merely to some collateral matter . . . .”). For example, if a man
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non-genital sex acts, and sex acts involving a transgender person’s genitals
would necessarily disclose the nature of those genitals. Given the
immateriality of anatomical sex to consent for non-genital sex acts, the lack
of duty to disclose anatomical sex generally, and the well-established rape
law principle that misrepresentation is not generally legally culpable, the
trans panic defense does not demonstrate that “sexual deception” or “sexual
fraud” is adequate provocation. Instead, it merely demonstrates the
obvious—that sexual relations are complicated.152
There is one serious scholarly defense of what is essentially a
provocation by rape claim in trans panic defenses. In expounding a theory
of provocation based on sexual misrepresentation, Bradford Bigler puts
forth a three-part test for determining when sexual misrepresentation is
legally cognizable as provocation: first, the defendant and victim must have
engaged in sexual activity; second, the misrepresentation must obscure a
fact which would be material to consent; and third, the misrepresented fact
would “be likely to cause a reasonable person a severe mental or emotional
crisis upon discovery.” 153 He argues that the triggering provocation in
cases where rape leads to a heat of passion is the lack of consent. 154

consents to receive oral sex from a trans woman, her transgender identity does not impact his
consent to oral sex. His consent is not voided by the fact that he was deceived about
something unrelated to the act, including the anatomical sex of his partner.
152
Professors Falk and Chamallas are critical from a feminist perspective of rigid or rote
application of the distinction between fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement. Falk,
supra note 128, at 171–72; Chamallas, supra note 88, at 832. Professor Falk summarizes
this objection, writing, “Diversity of opinion [exists] regarding the appropriate parameters of
legally effective consent in cases of rape by fraud.” She explains that “commentators’
suggestions . . . are more expansive than the traditional factum-inducement dichotomy and,
thereby, offer greater protection to potential victims.” Falk, supra note 128, at 171.
Following this line of reasoning to one possible extreme leads to Bigler’s conclusions
regarding sexual deception. See infra text accompanying notes 153–159. Following this
line of reasoning while criticizing the heterosexual privilege and male privilege inherent in
claims of trans panic might suggest rejecting claims of trans panic despite skepticism of the
“factum-inducement dichotomy”. Falk suggests defining rape by fraud starting from the
“coerciveness of fraud.” Falk, supra note 128, at 171–72. It is not clear whether or not the
specific facts of any trans panic claim would constitute coercive fraud after this redefinition
of rape. In any case, these theoretical considerations do not represent the current state of
rape law. Further analysis along these lines is outside the scope of this Comment.
153
Bigler, supra note 83, at 820. The author concedes the great difficulty of defining a
“sexual act” and leaves such determination to a case-by-case fact-finding outside the scope
of the comment. Id at 821.
154
Id. at 823. This seems to be right on its face; the presence or absence of force in a
sexual act does not, in itself, render the act “bad” or morally reprehensible. Id. at 823 n. 181.
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Starting with the premise that sexual acts obtained by fraud ought to be
legally culpable, 155 the argument then generalizes from rape law to sexual
misrepresentation. 156 According to Bigler, “[s]exual identity cases . . . seem
to straddle fraud in the inducement and fraud in fact.” 157 On one hand, the
defendant consented to a sex act, which was then consummated; Bigler
suggests this is fraud in inducement. On the other hand, Bigler writes,
“[T]he nature of the sex to which the deceived party consents (for example,
heterosexual sodomy in the case of Araujo) is fundamentally different than
the act in which the defendant actually engaged (here, homosexual
sodomy);” he suggests this is fraud in the factum. 158 In order for there to be
more than fraud in the inducement—for Bigler’s thesis to hold—
transgender people must be legally defined by their anatomical sex rather
than their self-identified gender. In short, Allen Andrade’s attorneys must
have been correct when they referred to Angie Zapata as Justin. 159
The crux of both Bigler’s theory of sexual misrepresentation and of the
trans panic defense is that transgender people cannot escape their birth sex.
Birth sex, however, is not as clear as the lay observer might believe.
“Recent medical literature indicates that approximately one to four percent
of the world’s population may be intersexed and have either ambiguous or
noncongruent sex features.” 160 Even if it were advisable to use the courts to
mandate disclosure of anatomical sex, this minority of people would be at
risk; a disgruntled sexual partner could point to “ambiguous or
noncongruent sex features” and claim they had been deceived regarding the
“true” biological sex of their intersex partner. Further, the argument that a
transgender person is defined not by their gender but by their anatomical
sex denies their experience and even their personhood. 161 Additionally, by
arguing for a genital-based provocation, both trans panic defenses and the

155
Id. at 823 n.183 (citing criticisms of rape law, including Falk, supra note 128, for the
proposition that obtaining consent by fraud should be morally culpable).
156
If, as the theory of rape by fraud asserts, obtaining consent based on a material
misrepresentation is rape, then some of the categories of misrepresentation (“sexual identity”
and “sexual health”) constitute adequate provocation insofar as they are, actually, categories
of rape. This implication, however, is left unexplored. See id. at 820–30.
157
Id. at 800.
158
Id. at 800–01.
159
Dunn, supra note 2.
160
Greenberg, supra note 39, at 267.
161
See generally Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An
Argument for the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 195
(1997) (arguing that the law should support self-actualization by trans people).
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theory of sexual misrepresentation privilege one form of gender
identification—anatomical sex—over many others. 162
VI. GENDER AUTONOMY AND THE TRANS PANIC DEFENSE
The government assigns legal gender or sex to people at birth. The sex
recorded on a birth certificate is a powerful identifier and follows people
through life. It is so important that some courts have refused to grant
changes even in the face of evidence that the original attribution was
incorrect. 163 There is broad agreement that some uses of a governmentmaintained gender classification are legitimate while others are not; police
officers and firefighters are now judged on merit rather than gender, while
compulsory draft registration and the right to marry are still based on
meeting specific gender restrictions. 164 As Professor Weiss argues,
“[T]ransexual people insist that they have the need and the right to
determine their own gender.” 165 She asserts a privacy claim on behalf of
transgender people not just for Brandeis’s famous “right to be let alone,” 166
but also as for the right to exist as autonomous sexual beings. 167 A
meaningful right to privacy confers on individuals the right to define their
own gender. This “undoubtedly raises administrative problems for the legal
systems . . . . However, it is no answer to say that administrative
convenience is superior to personhood, that since we cannot fit these
transsexual people into our pet theory of gender, they must accommodate

162

Jillian Todd Weiss diagnoses the complexity inherent to perceptions of gender:

There are many markers of gender, and of these, genitalia is the least significant for purposes of
daily functioning in society. Our perception of gender . . . is based on a conglomeration of
numerous factors, including but not limited to visual cues such as gait, body and facial
characteristics, body language, and dress; auditory cues such as voice and vocabulary; and
cultural cues such as interpersonal style, profession, job title, social status, and economic status.
If there is a greater number of factors associated with femininity, we see a female, if there is a
greater number of factors indicating masculinity, we see a male.

Weiss, supra note 41, at 179.
163
Id. at 167 n.139.
164
Id. at 168. The strict gender boundaries erected around marriage may be slowly
crumbling, but the vast majority of Americans are still restricted from marrying any person
who is not legally considered to be of the opposite sex.
165
Id.
166
Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167
Weiss, supra note 41, at 169–70. As Professor Weiss writes, “Privacy does not reside
in our actions, but in our selves. A ‘private’ life refers to the idea that each of us has our
own individual, i.e., private, self, which we are allowed to create as we will, within the
strictures of proper government power,” and which cannot be otherwise abridged by the
polity. Id. at 170.
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their identity to our . . . notions of reality.” 168 Exposing transgender people
to the risk of mitigation by trans panic as a consequence of their
actualization of deeply held gender identities is an unfair, cruel burden to
place upon a group which already suffers under the burden of transphobia
and homophobia.
VII. RESPONDING TO TRANS PANIC IN THE COURTROOM
Faced with the legally insufficient, morally suspect trans panic
defense, what is to be done? There are two major responses available to
combat the trans panic defense: legislative bans or changes to jury
instructions. Critics of the gay panic defense have largely called for it to be
judicially or legislatively banned. 169 Following this prohibitory instinct,
California became the first state in the nation to ban “panic” defenses based
in homophobia or transphobia in 2006. 170 The statute, A.B. 1160, 171 is
simple but powerful; it codifies disapproval of panic defenses. 172
Specifically, it reads:
In any criminal trial or proceeding, upon the request of a party, the court shall instruct
the jury substantially as follows: “Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public
opinion influence your decision. Bias includes bias against the victim or victims,
witnesses, or defendant based upon his or her disability, gender, nationality, race or
ethnicity, religion, gender identity, or sexual orientation. 173

Such a jury instruction “activates the notion of bias in the minds of the
jurors, hopefully prompting them to examine the extent to which prejudice
may be factoring into their decisions.”174 The combination of public policy
disapproval of panic defenses and an affirmative instruction provides a
strong disincentive against the use of trans panic defenses. Legislative
action like California’s has the advantage of “uniformity and
168

Id. at 181.
See Lee, supra note 50, at 549–50. “A critic of the gay panic defense might contend
that the simplest way to deal with the problem would be for the legislature to pass a statute
stating that a non-violent homosexual advance does not constitute legally adequate
provocation.” Id.
170
Press Release, Transgender Law Center, Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act
Becomes Law!, (September 28, 2006), available at http://transgenderlawcenter.org/
new/index.php/ updates/press-releases/gwen-araujo-justice-for-victims-act-becomes-law.
171
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127h (West 2010).
172
Section 2(g) of A.B. 1160 reads: “It is against public policy for a defendant to be
acquitted of a charged offense or convicted of a lesser included offense based upon an appeal
to the societal bias that may be possessed by members of a jury.” 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 550
(West).
173
PENAL § 1127h.
174
Annicchiarico, supra note 82, at 146.
169
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consistency.” 175 Additionally, there is no longer jury discretion to reduce
verdicts unilaterally or an argument on appeal about the trial judge’s refusal
to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. 176 A legislative ban on the use of
trans panic defenses has the additional salutary effect of signaling the
polity’s opposition to the underlying arguments being made by potential
defendants. 177
In states where political forces prevent the adoption of a statute like
A.B. 1160, it may still be possible to change jury instructions to combat
trans panic defenses. Existing jury instructions on provocation offer an
invitation for jurors to insert their personal reaction to transgender people in
the criminal justice system through use of the reasonable person standard. 178
Open-ended “heat of passion” instructions also leave the door open for
defense attorneys to prompt the subconscious biases of jurors.179 A
potential solution is to instruct jurors that the reasonable person is one who
“would not kill based on . . . transgender revelation.” 180 The adoption of
these instructions, or others similar to them, across the country could
dramatically reduce the use and effectiveness of the trans panic defense.
Writing about gay panic defenses, Professor Cynthia Lee raises an
important objection to simply banning explicit provocation defenses based
on homosexual advances. She argues that such bans are counterproductive.
“Attempts to ban the argument . . . from the criminal courtroom will not
work because defense attorneys will find more subtle ways to get the same
idea across to the jury.” 181 Further, she points to research on race and
implicit bias and argues that having gay panic defenses aired in the
courtroom where the prosecution can aggressively counter them will
produce less-biased outcomes than any legislative or judicial ban.182
While the danger from coded appeals to anti-gay or anti-trans bias is
apparent, the either/or choice that is implicit in Professor Lee’s proposals
for combating the gay panic defense seems to be false. If defense attorneys
attempt to use subtle triggers for jurors’ latent biases against transgender
175

Lee, supra note 50, at 550.
Annicchiarico, supra note 82, at 142.
177
Id. This would be a further statement in those states with transgender-inclusive hate
crimes laws.
178
For example, California’s instructions read: “The heat of passion which will reduce a
homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion as would be aroused in the mind of an
ordinarily reasonable person in the same circumstances.” Cal. Jury Instructions, Criminal
§ 8.42.
179
Annicchiarico, supra note 82, at 145.
180
Id. at 146.
181
Lee, supra note 50, at 522.
182
Id. at 536–49.
176
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people, a legislative ban on trans panic defenses does not prevent
prosecutors from responding. 183 One common example of this subtle
appeal to anti-trans bias was on display in the Angie Zapata trial; defense
lawyers consistently attempted to remind juror of Angie’s earlier life as a
boy. Angie’s family consistently countered this tactic: “Family members
and friends echoed repeatedly, ‘my sister,’ ‘Angie,’ one by one on the
stand . . . as public defenders Annette Kundelius and Brad Martin
questioned them about ‘Justin.’” 184 The family’s response—using Angie’s
name and female pronouns—is one effective response; jurors cannot help
but identify with grieving family members, and those family members’
acceptance of Angie as transgender likely played a role in the first-degree
murder conviction. Prosecutors also actively countered bias-motivated
arguments in their statements. 185
Not every family will be as sympathetic as the Zapatas—many
transgender people are still rejected by their families. Prosecutors,
however, are always present in the criminal courtroom and can play a
critical role in combating trans panic defenses regardless of whether there is
legislative action or new jury instructions for provocation. Already,
prosecutors have begun to educate each other on combating bias defenses;
Fulton County, Georgia District Attorney Paul Howard hosted perhaps the
first ever conference for prosecutors on responding to gay panic defenses.
A year later, San Francisco District Attorney Kamala Harris hosted a
similar conference, “Defeating the ‘Panic Defense’” at the Hastings College
of Law in July 2006. 186
Removing trans panic defenses from American courtrooms will take a
concerted effort by activists, lawyers, and citizens. Where possible,
legislative bans like that in California or jury instruction revisions should be
made. Even in the absence of political will at the state level, however,
judges and prosecutors can work to ensure that cases in which they are
involved are not decided based on a legally insufficient, morally suspect
trans panic defense.

183
Prosecutors in the Zapata trial were aggressive in countering explicit and implicit
appeals to transphobia. See supra text accompanying notes 25–30.
184
Sharon Dunn, Angie Zapata’s Friends, Family Take the Stand, GREELEY TRIB.
(Apr. 18, 2009), http://www.greeleytribune.com/article/20090418/NEWS/904189952.
185
See supra text accompanying notes 25–30.
186
Zak Szymanski, Harris Announces ‘Panic Defense’ Conference, BAY AREA REP.
(Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.ebar.com/news/article.php?sec=news&article=690. The San
Francisco conference benefited from the presence of Alameda County Deputy District
Attorney Chris Lamiero, who prosecuted Gwen Aruajo’s killers.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: A RADICALLY INCLUSIVE PROVOCATION
JURISPRUDENCE
The trans panic defense, whether advanced in the courtroom or in legal
academia, eventually rests on the false claim that a transgender victim is
defined by their anatomical sex, irrespective of the gender that he or she felt
inside. In addition to being morally suspect, the trans panic defense lacks
legal merit. Neither a transgender person’s gender identity nor the
revelation thereof constitutes adequate provocation for a mitigation defense.
Similarly, a transgender person’s refusal to affirmatively disclose their
anatomical sex—what defendants call fraud—does not constitute adequate
provocation. Finally, the trans panic defense constitutes a state-sanctioned
injury to transgender people’s right of gender self-determination. As a legal
theory, the trans panic mitigation defense is indefensible and should be
rejected.
As transgender legal scholar Jillian Todd Weiss eloquently writes:
There is a substantial and growing body of evidence supporting the theory that
physical sex and psychological gender are not always congruent. The transsexual
citizens of our country, a substantial number of them, have turned their lives upside
down because there is an incongruity between their physical sex and psychological
gender. Our law must reflect that reality. The failure of the law to accord any
meaning to the transsexual peoples’ claim is a theoretical model which denies their
personhood, their essential humanity. 187

Since there is no legal ground to support the trans panic defense, the
legal system is obligated to respect transgender victims of horrific violence.
Whether through legislative action or zealous prosecution, states across
America should follow California’s lead and work to consign the trans
panic defense to the dustbin of history.

187

Weiss, supra note 41, at 185–86.

